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ABSTRACT
The present research addresses whether narcissists are more overconﬁdent than others
and whether this overconﬁdence leads to deﬁcits in decision making. In Study 1, nar-
cissism predicted overconﬁdence. This was attributable to narcissists’ greater conﬁ-
dence despite no greater accuracy. In Study 2, participants were offered fair bets on
their answers. Narcissists lost signiﬁcantly more points in this betting task than non-
narcissists, due both to their greater overconﬁdence and greater willingness to bet.
Finally, in Study 3, narcissists’ predictions of future performance were based on per-
formance expectations rather than actual performance. This research extends the litera-
ture on betting on knowledge to the important personality dimension of narcissism.
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Individual differences matter in decision making. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), among many others, have
pointed out that average decision strategies can be misleading, as they may reﬂect decision strategies that no
single decision-maker employs. It is often better to explore the decisions that individuals reach. Furthermore,
reliable differences in which kinds of people make which kind of decisions are important. Stanovich and
West (2000), for example, have defended the reality of various cognitive illusions by demonstrating that
people who violate conventionally deﬁned norms tend to be those who perform less well in other domains.
Looking at the same base of data, Funder (2000) argued that the observed correlation constitutes standard
validation of the test items, and that the ability of some people to solve the problems correctly indicates an
absence of systematic irrationality. Beyond theoretical concerns, there are also clear practical applications of
such ﬁndings, as, for example, organizations could use individual differences measures to avoid hiring indi-
viduals who are more likely to be error-prone, when hiring for important decision-making positions. In this
paper, we examine how the well-validated personality construct of narcissism is predictive of conﬁdence,
risk taking, and performance on a task in which conﬁdence and risk taking are central parts.
Approaching these questions is facilitated by the recent reinvigoration of decision-making research using
bets that are based on conﬁdence in knowledge (e.g., Goodie, 2003, in press; Heath & Tversky, 1991). In these
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Contract/grant sponsor: University of Georgia Research Foundation, USA.tasks, participants make decisions about bets that are determined by the participants’ uncertain knowledge and
the conﬁdence they place in it. In such tasks, typical conﬁdence calibration results—underconﬁdence at low
conﬁdence and overconﬁdence at high conﬁdence—produces bets that are positively valued at low conﬁdence
and negatively valued at high conﬁdence. Yet, participants typically become more willing to accept risk as
conﬁdence increases, a ﬁnding that has been termed ‘‘paradoxical betting’’ (Goodie, 2003). Because of the
possibility that narcissists are both more overconﬁdent and more risk-taking than others, such a betting-on-
knowledge task is an inviting target for exploring individual differences on the dimension of narcissism.
The construct of narcissism
The present research is concerned with the personality variable of narcissism (sometimes referred to as ‘‘nor-
mal narcissism’’) rather than the far less common clinical disorder of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).
The scale used to measure normal narcissism (the narcissistic personality inventory, or NPI, Raskin & Terry,
1988) was adopted from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) criteria for
NPD (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), to explore potential effects and correlates in nonclinical
populations of a trait that, in extreme forms, constitutes a distinct mental disorder. Consistent with conven-
tion, we use the terms ‘‘narcissists’’ and ‘‘non-narcissists’’ to describe individuals scoring higher and lower
on measures of normal narcissism. We do this for ease of presentation; we do not intend to create a typology
where none exists. Nor do we intend to create the impression that narcissism is more than a theoretical per-
sonality construct.
Narcissism is a dynamic, socially deﬁned construct with two keyelements: a positive,inﬂated, and agentic
view of the self; and a self-regulatory strategy to maintain and enhance this positive self-view (for a review,
see Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Narcissists’ positive self-views have been demonstrated empirically in sev-
eral ways. Narcissists differentially think that they are special and unique (Emmons, 1984), that they are
entitled to more positive outcomes in life than are others (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman,
2004), that they are more intelligent and physically attractive than they actually are (e.g., Gabriel, Critelli, &
Ee, 1994), and that theyare better than others on agentic traits (e.g., dominance, power) butnot on communal
traits (caring, morality; Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002).
In terms of self-regulatory strategies, empirical research demonstrates that narcissists use both intrap-
sychic and interpersonal strategies to maintain their positive self-views. On the intrapsychic side, narcissists
fantasize about fame (Raskin & Novacek, 1991) and strategically attribute responsibility for their own suc-
cess to abilities (e.g., Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000; Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998). On
the interpersonal side, narcissists differentially brag and draw attention to the self (Buss & Chiodo, 1991),
and strive to compete with and dominate others (e.g., Carroll, 1987). Narcissists also desire to associate with
high-status others in order to gain esteem (Campbell, 1999). Not surprisingly, narcissists shift the blame for
failures onto colleagues (John & Robins, 1994) or evaluators (Kernis & Sun, 1994).
In the simplest terms, one can think of narcissists as individuals for whom enhancing the positivity of the
self (speciﬁcally, to achieve status and esteem) is overwhelmingly important. Much of their psychological
and social lives is directed toward this goal. In the present research, we look at decision making as one of the
domains of narcissists’ behavior that may be differentially distorted by the striving for status and esteem.
One might suspect that narcissists have a particular long-term interest in making reasonable and measured
decisions, based on the causal reasoning: good decisions!success!status and esteem, and the fact that
status and esteem have heightened salience for narcissists. However, we suspected that narcissists’decisions
may be undermined by their short-term interest in maintaining an inﬂated self-image (cf. Robins & Beer,
2001). Narcissists’ grandiose self-views may preclude the realistic appraisal of one’s likelihood of success
needed for successful decisions, resulting in overconﬁdence and risk-taking.
We propose that individuals with elevated scores on the trait of narcissism (i.e., narcissists) are more likely
than others to be overconﬁdent in their judgments and to turn their poor judgments into costly decisions.
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emphasized in the personality literature are the accurate assessment of one’s abilities, and appropriate striv-
ings toward success (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993). Narcissists are susceptible to deﬁcits in both of
these domains: They are likely to overestimate their own abilities and also to make inappropriately risky
decisions, with the conﬂict between maintaining the positivity of their self-concept and performing well at
the tasks in which they engage. Narcissists need to feel that they are superior to others. To maintain this feeling
they must outperform others. However, if they approach a performance task with an inﬂated self-opinion and a
willingness to ‘‘swing for the fences (i.e., take big risks),’’ their performance may ultimately suffer.
Decision making: Overconﬁdence and risk-taking
Overconﬁdence. Overconﬁdence refers to an inﬂated subjective probability of a particular outcome
occurring. In an achievement setting, this is observed as a positive difference between assessed conﬁdence
and observed achievement. In a typical paradigm, many factual questions are asked, and conﬁdence in each
answer is assessed. Overconﬁdence is deﬁned as a positive difference between average conﬁdence and
average accuracy. A negative difference is called underconﬁdence, whereas zero difference is idealized
calibration. In general, overconﬁdence has been observed in a large literature (Budescu, Wallsten, & Au,
1997), particularly when conﬁdence is relatively high (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977), although various
means have been devised to diminish or even eliminate it (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991; Juslin, 1994). At low
conﬁdence, underconﬁdence is typically observed.
Risk-taking. The overconﬁdence literature has occasionally branched from the domain of judgment to that
of decision making (e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Goodie, 2003; Heath & Tversky, 1991).
Overconﬁdence has deleterious consequences when the interval between judged probability and actual
probability contains the boundary between a winning bet and a losing one. For example, when faced with an
even-money bet with a 40% chance of winning, which is a losing proposition, the well-calibrated Bettor A
will reject it. In contrast, the overconﬁdent Bettor B may view it as having a 60% chance of succeeding, and
accept the bet.
Such borderline conditions of betting on one’s conﬁdence were used by Goodie (2003, in press). Partici-
pants, after answering and assessing conﬁdence in many questions, were given the opportunity to bet on each
of the answers, with bets that were individually constructed to be fair (having zero average marginal value) if
conﬁdencewas well-calibrated. These bets were positively valued if underconﬁdent, and negatively valued if
overconﬁdent. For all answers, participants faced a choice between accepting a certain outcome and betting
on the correctness of their answer. It was found that people were increasingly willing to accept the bets as
they became more conﬁdent, despite average bet values that steadily declined with increasing conﬁdence.
This ﬁnding has been dubbed ‘‘paradoxical betting’’ (Goodie, 2003).
Narcissism, overconﬁdence, and risk-taking
As noted, there are at least two potential pitfalls in narcissists’ performance when they make bets on their
knowledge. Heightened overconﬁdence may reﬂect narcissists’ inﬂated estimates of skill and ability, and the
desire to maintain these estimates. And heightened risk-taking may be a manifestation of narcissists’ focus
on success.
Narcissists might be expected to display elevated degrees of overconﬁdence. They have high self-opinions
in important, achievement-oriented self-concept domains. Do narcissists’ self-opinions reﬂect actual suc-
cess? The available data are mixed, but more consistent with the conclusion that narcissists’ performance
does not exceed that of non-narcissists. Narcissists, for example, rate their intelligence as being higher than
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Likewise, narcissists rate their performance on group tasks more highly than do non-narcissists, but ratings
by neutral judges ﬁnd no actual performance differences (John & Robins, 1994). In the present research, we
predicted that in a conﬁdence calibration task, narcissists would rate their own performance highly, but that
their performance would be equivalent to that of non-narcissists. That is, narcissists would display more
overconﬁdence.
A second pitfall in narcissists’ decision making may be their willingness to take risks. Risk-taking, of
course, is not always a poor decision. However, when coupled with overconﬁdence over many bets in the
task setting used in the present research, risk-taking systematically leads to losses unless it is focused exclu-
sively on low-conﬁdence items. What is the available evidence that narcissists take bigger risks than non-
narcissists? First, narcissists display a distinctive approach orientation. They are focused on success and
achievement, and display little conscious avoidance orientation or fear of failure (see Elliot & Thrash,
2001). This greater focus on success could lead them to place bets on successful outcomes with less worry
about poor performance. Also, there is empirical evidence for narcissists’ elevated reports of sensation-
seeking (Emmons, 1991). Research has also demonstrated a link between threatened self-esteem and risk-
taking (Baumeister, et al., 1993). In a series of experiments, individuals with high self-esteem were asked to
perform on a novel computer ﬂight game that included betting on one’s own performance in one condition.
Self-esteem had a negative impact on performancewhen ego-threat was induced. To the extent that high self-
esteem is reﬂected in narcissism, this result is consistent with the prediction that narcissists will display more
risk-taking on tasks involving their own knowledge.
The present research
In three studies, we examined the links between narcissism, overconﬁdence, risk-taking, and performance.
We predicted that narcissists would perform worse than non-narcissists on a knowledge-based betting task,
as a result of their greater overconﬁdence in their own abilities and their greater willingness to take risks. We
also predicted that narcissists’ self-beliefs would prove resilient in the face of poor performance. Study 1
examinedthe relationship between narcissism and overconﬁdenceon a knowledge-based task. Study 2exam-
ined narcissists’ willingness to bet on their performance in the same task. Study 3 replicated Study 2 and also
assessed predictions about performance before the task, estimates of performance after the task, and esti-
mates of future performance.
STUDY 1
Study 1 examined the link between narcissism and overconﬁdence, using a computer-administered question
task. Several additional individual difference constructs were also measured, including self-esteem, self-
control, and self-efﬁcacy. This allowed us to distinguish the effects of narcissism from these other individual
differences.
Method
Participants. One hundred four participants (78 women and 26 men, median age 18) were recruited from
the Research Pool of the University of Georgia Psychology Department. Participants volunteered in
exchange for course credit.
Materials. The study was conducted in a room divided into three individual workstations, each equipped
with a personal computer. In addition to the overconﬁdence task (described below) and a demographic
questionnaire asking for sex, age, and racial/ethnic self-identiﬁcation, we assessed narcissism with the NPI
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DSM-III and has been validated in clinical settings (Priﬁtera & Ryan, 1984); however, it is intended for use
as a measure of normal narcissism in normal populations. The NPI has been validated extensively (e.g.,
Emmons, 1984; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995). These validation studies include not just
self-reports, but observer ratings (e.g., Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991) and behavioral measures (e.g.,
Robins & John, 1997). The NPI contains 40 forced-choice items with a range of possible scores from 0 to 40.
Sample narcissistic items include: ‘‘If I ruled the world it would be a better place;’’ ‘‘I think I am a special
person;’’ ‘‘I know that I am a good person because everybody keeps telling me so;’’ and ‘‘I will be a success.’’
The NPI is the most widely-used measure of narcissism in normal populations. Measures of self-esteem
(Rosenberg, 1965), self-efﬁcacy (Sherer, Maddux, Mercandante, Prenticedunn, Jacobs, & Rogers, 1982) and
self-control (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), as well as other personality measures for a separate study
(Schaefer, Williams, Goodie, & Campbell, in press) were presented to participants on the computer.
Procedure. After giving informed consent, participants completed the personality inventories. The
conﬁdence calibration task was then administered.
This task employed two kinds of questions, depicted in the two panels of Figure 1, which also illustrates
the format in which stimuli were presented on a computer screen to participants. The ﬁrst kind of question,
depicted in Figure 1a, isa two-alternativeforced choiceversion of a general knowledge question (GKQ). The
questions were adapted from a set of 299 questions compiled by Nelson and Narens (1980).
1 Separately for
each participant, 150 of these questions were randomly selected and presented in a random order. The second
kind of question (Figure 1b) asked for conﬁdence in each answer to be placed in one of the following cate-
gories: 50–52%; 53–60%; 61–70%; 71–80%; 81–90%, 91–97%; and 98–100%. For all analyses, conﬁdence
was taken as the midpoint of the selected conﬁdence category.
Figure 1. The two types of questions asked in Study 1: (a) general knowledge question; (b) conﬁdence assessment
1The use of arbitrarily selected test items is controversial (e.g., Juslin, Winman, & Olsson, 2000). We used them in the present studies in
orderto create a baselineofoverconﬁdence.Anticipating, aswe did,thatnarcissists wouldbe moreoverconﬁdentthanothers,wewanted
to give them every opportunity to prove us wrong. By using a task in which typical people are typically overconﬁdent, we made it
possible for narcissists to be less overconﬁdent than others, and even to do so while being somewhat overconﬁdent.
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Descriptive statistics for the narcissism score were: M¼16.58, sd¼7.04. Average conﬁdence was 0.801,
and average accuracy was 0.721, resulting in average overconﬁdence of 0.080.
As predicted, narcissism was a signiﬁcant predictor of overconﬁdence, r¼0.28, p<0.01. This correlation
is entirely due to the relationship between narcissism and conﬁdence, r¼0.29, p<0.01, and not to a nega-
tive relationship between narcissism and accuracy, r¼ 0.04, n.s. That is, narcissists were more conﬁdent in
their answers than others, but they were no more accurate. In all but the lowest conﬁdence category, the
quartile of participants highest on the NPI was substantially more overconﬁdent than the lowest quartile,
as depicted in Figure 2.
The narcissism–overconﬁdence link remained signiﬁcant in a regression that included self-esteem, self-
efﬁcacy, and self-control in the model: for narcissism, b¼0.33, t(99)¼3.16, p<0.01. None of the other
variables showed a signiﬁcant relationship to overconﬁdence (all p’s >0.30).
In sum, narcissism was positively linked to overconﬁdence in a laboratory-administered judgment task.
The link remained signiﬁcant when several other related individual differences variables were statistically
controlled for.
STUDY 2
Study 1 demonstrated that overconﬁdence was positively associated with narcissism in a laboratory setting.
Study 2 included a betting decision as well as a conﬁdence judgment, which extends the research in two
important ways. First, the decision to accept or reject a fair bet serves as a conservative measure of risk-
taking. Second, and more importantly, it introduces a behavioral performance measure consisting of the out-
comes of participants’ bets.
We constructed bets that were exactly fair (having zero averagevalue) if participants werewell-calibrated.
Participants won points if their trivia answer was correct, and lost points if their answer was incorrect. The
gain-if-right was always 100 points, and the loss-if-wrong varied according to the participants’ conﬁdence in
each answer. Speciﬁcally:
loss-if-wrong ¼ 100  ð confidence=ð1   confidenceÞÞ points ð1Þ
The bet is negatively valued when participants are overconﬁdent, and positively valued when they are under-
conﬁdent. Furthermore, the more overconﬁdent one is, the more negative the average value of bets is (see
Goodie, 2003).
Figure 2. Conﬁdence calibration (accuracy as a function of calibration) in Study 1. Perfect calibration would conform to
the identity line. Two effects are evident: people are generally overconﬁdent (accuracy falling below conﬁdence); and
narcissists (the top quartile on NPI) are more overconﬁdent than non-narcissists (the bottom quartile on NPI)
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were of lower average value than the bets offered to non-narcissists. Would they accept these lower-valued
bets? We predicted that narcissists would be more risk-seeking than non-narcissists, leading to much lower
point totals that result from both greater overconﬁdence and increased risk-taking.
Method
Participants. Ninety-sevenparticipants (66 female and 31 male, median age 18) were drawn from the same
population as Study 1.
Procedure. The study began with demographic data and the NPI, followed by the overconﬁdence task with
101 questions. After completing the conﬁdence calibration task, participants were offered a bet on the basis
of each question asked in the conﬁdence calibration phase. Each question was re-posed, with a reminder of
the participant’s answer (but not of her conﬁdence in the answer). A bet was offered on the same screen, as
described above. Following each betting choice, participants were immediately informed of the correct
answer, the outcome of the trial (any change in points) and their updated point total. This procedure provided
the opportunity to compensate for overconﬁdence by rejecting bets. The methods in this phase of the study
were essentially identical to those used in the betting-on-conﬁdence studies of Goodie (2003, in press).
Results and discussion
The narcissism scores were similar to those of Study 1, M¼17.23, sd¼6.65. Average conﬁdencewas 0.800,
and average accuracy was 0.735, yielding average overconﬁdence of 0.065. Average bet acceptance was
63.1%. Consistent with the general overconﬁdence and robust betting observed by Goodie (2003), the aver-
age ﬁnal point total was well below zero,  18280 points. Only 28 out of 97 participants ﬁnished with non-
negative point totals.
Consistent with the results of Study 1, narcissism was associated positively with overconﬁdence, r¼0.30,
p<0.01. This reﬂected an association with conﬁdence, r¼0.32, p<0.01, and not with accuracy, r¼ 0.03,
n.s. This is displayed in Figure 3. The lowest quartile on NPI (non-narcissists) was consistently less over-
conﬁdent than the highest quartile. Also consistent with predictions, narcissism was positively related to
risk-taking (i.e., bet acceptance), r¼0.20, p<0.05. Finally and perhaps most importantly, narcissists lost
more points than did non-narcissists, r¼ 0.24, p<0.05.
Figure 3. Conﬁdence calibration in Study 2
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both overconﬁdence and risk-taking. Overconﬁdence (b¼ 0.54, t(94)¼ 7.18, p<0.01) and risk-taking
(b¼ 0.36, t(94)¼ 4.79, p<0.01) simultaneously predicted performance negatively. Then we created a
regression model with narcissism, overconﬁdence, and risk-taking as predictor variables and points as the
outcome variable. Consistent with our mediational hypotheses, the standardized regression coefﬁcient asso-
ciated with narcissism dropped to non-signiﬁcance in this model, b¼ 0.01, t(93)¼ 0.12, p¼0.91. The
standardized regression coefﬁcients associated with overconﬁdence (b¼ 0.54, t(93)¼ 6.82, p<0.01)
and risk-taking (b¼ 0.36, t(93)¼ 4.68, p<0.01) remained signiﬁcant. This mediation was conﬁrmed
statistically (using the Sobel test, z’s ¼2.83, p<0.01 and 1.87, p¼0.06, respectively) and is depicted gra-
phically in Figure 4.
To summarize, narcissists displayed both greater overconﬁdence and heightened risk-taking in a task
based on their own knowledge. This overconﬁdence and risk-taking resulted in diminished attainment by
narcissists.
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we examined the links between self-beliefs and performance on our betting task. Previous
research suggests that self-beliefs can greatly affect future performance estimates (e.g., Ehrlinger &
Dunning, 2003). To examine this possibility with narcissists, we measured performance expectations before
the betting task was initiated, as well as estimates of performance on the task (after completion), and esti-
mates of performance on a similar future task. We hypothesized that narcissists enter the situation with posi-
tive expectations and maintain those positive beliefs even in the face of poor performance feedback. In a
sense, we predicted that narcissists would use a ‘‘top-down’’strategy for self-assessment: ‘‘I am good, there-
fore I will do well on this task, did do well, and will do well in the future.’’ The implications of this strategy
for decision making by narcissists are that narcissists might remain persistently overconﬁdent regardless of
how they perform.
Narcissists’ self-beliefs, however, are not expected to be completely detached from reality. Estimates of
performance by narcissists might be inﬂuenced by both expectations of performance prior to completing the
task and actual performance on the task. We base this on the ﬁnding that it is more difﬁcult to bias estimates
of performance when objective assessments are readily available (Felson, 1981). On the other hand, because
point totals by themselves (without anyother participants’totals) do not directly reﬂect relativeperformance,
it was possible—and would be normatively defensible—for the performance feedback used here to have no
Figure 4. The relationships among narcissism, overconﬁdence, risk-taking, and total points in Study 2. Asterisks refer to
statistically signiﬁcant beta-weights (*p<0.05; **p<0.01)
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ing the task, it should be relatively easy to bias one’s performance projections. Likewise, estimates about
future performance are likely to be biased. In other words, it may be easier for narcissists to bias thoughts
about where they are going than where they have been.
Method
Participants. Six hundred seven participants (340 female and 267 male, median age 19) were drawn from
the same population as Studies 1 and 2.
Procedure. As in both previous studies, demographic data and NPI scores were ﬁrst attained. The betting-
on-conﬁdence task used in Study 2 was then administered. Three measures were added to this study,
however, that assessed: (a) how well participants thought they would perform in the task (‘‘Initial
Performance Expectation’’); (b) how well they thought they performed in the task (‘‘Performance
Assessment’’); and (c) how well they thought they would perform on a similar task in the future (‘‘Future
Performance Expectation’’). Each of these three measures was assessed on a 10-point scale, with low scores
(‘‘1’’) indicating they expected to surpass few (5%) others and high scores (‘‘10’’) indicating they expected
to surpass most (95%) others. The ﬁrst measure was administered just prior to the beginning of the betting
phase, and the others immediately following the betting phase. Thus, participants were aware of their scores
before ﬁlling out the ﬁnal two questions.
Results and discussion
Narcissism scores were similar to those reported in the ﬁrst two studies, M¼17.46, sd¼6.95. Similar to
Study 2, participants ended the task with an average of  19027 points. Also similar to Study 2 were average
levels of conﬁdence (0.803), accuracy (0.744), and overconﬁdence (0.059).
As in Studies 1 and 2, narcissism was again correlated signiﬁcantly with overconﬁdence, r¼0.10,
p<0.05. This reﬂected a statistically signiﬁcant association with conﬁdence, r¼0.13, p<0.01, but not
accuracy, r¼0.02, n.s. Also consistent with the previous two studies, narcissism was negatively correlated
with the number of points earned, r¼ 0.17, p<0.001. Surprisingly, however, narcissism, in this study, was
not signiﬁcantly correlated with risk-taking (i.e., bet acceptance), r¼0.05, n.s.
Because number of points was correlated with overconﬁdence, r¼ 0.64, p<0.001, we tested a model in
which overconﬁdence mediates the association between narcissism and points, as was done in Study 2. This
model included narcissism and overconﬁdence as simultaneous predictors of points. Because of the large
sample, even minor associations would be signiﬁcant, and in this model overconﬁdence, b¼ 0.63,
t(604)¼ 20.43, p<0.001, and narcissism, b¼ 0.11, t(604)¼ 3.39, p<0.01, remained signiﬁcant pre-
dictors of points. However, the association between overconﬁdence and points was nearly unchanged,
whereas the absolute association between narcissism and points dropped from r¼ 0.17 to r¼ 0.11. This
represented a signiﬁcant mediation, z¼2.34, p<0.05. Consistent with Study 2, the relation between narcis-
sism and points was partially mediated by overconﬁdence.
Participants reported mean initial performance expectations, performance assessments, and future perfor-
mance expectations of 6.40, 4.32, and 6.45 percentiles, respectively. Narcissism was correlated signiﬁcantly
with all three performance estimates, r’s ¼0.19, 0.09, and 0.21, p’s <0.001, 0.05, and 0.001, respectively,
suggesting that narcissists expected to do better, thought that they had done better, and predicted that they
would do better on a similar future task. To examine whether narcissists inﬂated their performance estimates
regardless of performance, we regressed each of the three performance estimates onto both narcissism and
points simultaneously. Narcissism positively predicted performance estimates even after points were
statistically controlled, including initial performance expectations (b¼0.20, t(604)¼4.9, p<0.001),
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t(602)¼5.6, p<0.001). These results suggest that narcissists estimate their abilities, at least partially, on the
basis of factors unrelated to objective performance. That is, judgments of performance by narcissists appear
to be at least partially schema-based.
We next tested a theoretical model of the extent to which narcissists rely upon schema and upon observa-
tion when making assessments of performance immediately following feedback about performance and
when making predictions about future performance. Our model (see Figure 5) strongly ﬁts the data, suggest-
ing that higher narcissism contributes both to higher initial performance expectations and to fewer points.
Both elevated number of points and initial performance expectations then contribute to elevated performance
assessments. The impact of points on initial performance expectations conﬁrms that participants’ own point
totals, without any comparative feedback regarding other participants’ point totals, can affect relative self-
ratings. Future performance expectations, however, are produced both by performance assessments (which
are based partially on points earned) and initial performance expectations (which are not based on points
earned). In summary, future performance expectations by narcissists are driven partially by assessments
based upon performance, but also largely by predictions of performance made prior to awareness of actual
performance. Predictions of future performance by narcissists are thus both schema and data-driven—data-
driven in that they depend partially on their performance assessments, which are linked to actual perfor-
mance, schema-driven in that they depend on their initial performance estimates, which are made prior to
performing the task.
As predicted, performance by narcissists, though contributing directly to their performance appraisals,
was not linked directly to their future performance expectations. This is depicted in the model by the absence
of a path from points to future performance expectations. We tested a model with this path included, and the
model ﬁt was not signiﬁcantly improved,  
2(df¼1)¼0.54, n.s. By comparison, the effect of removing the
path from future performance expectations to future performance expectations on model ﬁt was substantial,
 
2(df¼1)¼257.15, p<0.05.
The results of Study 3 help to explain why narcissists remain positive about their abilities and perfor-
mance, even when faced with poor performance. Narcissistic performance beliefs are rooted in an inﬂated
ego. Though narcissists in this study had no evidence that they performed better than others (indeed, they
underperformed), they nevertheless rated their past and future performance as above average. Regardless of
Figure 5. A theoretical model of the extenttowhich narcissists relied upon schema and observation when making assess-
ments of performance in Study 3. Note: IPE¼initial performance expectations; PA¼performance assessments;
FPE¼future performance expectations
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pleted; and (b) do better than others in the future on a task similar to one just completed. Only the perfor-
mance assessment was inﬂuenced directly by actual performance, though even these assessments were also
signiﬁcantly affected by pre-existing beliefs. The underperforming narcissists reported that they overper-
formed. Their future performance expectations were driven heavily by their inﬂated performance estimates
made prior to engaging in the task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We predicted that the socially deﬁned personality construct of narcissism would be negatively predictive of
judgments when judgmental accuracy could be objectively assessed, and of decision making in a setting with
bets that were designed to be fair. Furthermore, we predicted that narcissists’ decision making would be
negatively predicted by both their overconﬁdence in their own abilities and their willingness to accept risky
bets. Finally, we predicted that narcissists’ inﬂated assessments of performance and expectations of future
performance would be schema-driven, that is, based more on performance expectations prior to completing
the task than on task performance.
These predictions were tested in three studies. Narcissists were found to be more overconﬁdent than non-
narcissists on a computer-administered conﬁdence calibration task. This overconﬁdence was the result of
inﬂated ability estimates that were not accompanied by greater ability (Study 1). Narcissists were then found
to underperform (i.e., lose more points) on a betting task, reﬂecting narcissists’ greater overconﬁdence and
willingness to place risky bets (Study 2). Finally, we found evidence that narcissists assess their performance
based less on how they actually perform and more on how they expect to perform (Study 3). This was espe-
cially true when narcissists predicted how well they would perform on a similar future task.
It is notable that a group of individuals who think they are smarter than others (and are notably willing to
proclaim this publicly, e.g., Buss & Chiodo, 1991) performs so poorly in the betting-on-knowledge task. In
‘‘no-lose’’situations where big bets are necessary, a narcissist may have a real advantage. Narcissists would
be expected to outperform non-narcissists in these settings where there is no cost to overconﬁdence and risk-
taking. Likewise, narcissists may outperform others in settings where, on average, individuals underestimate
their own skills. For example, it is often said that ‘‘in a bull market everyone who buys is a genius.’’ Essen-
tially, the ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ of a bull market is a perfect complement to the unwarranted conﬁdence of
the narcissist.
The present studies also replicate the phenomenon of paradoxical betting (Goodie, 2003), and begin to
explore which individuals may be more susceptible to it than others. Participants as a whole were undercon-
ﬁdent at low conﬁdence and overconﬁdent at high conﬁdence. With the arbitrarily selected items used here,
overconﬁdence in the main prevailed. Yet, participants bet most of the time, and showed the increasing bet
acceptance observed by Goodie (2003, in press) that stands in inverse relation to both the objective average
value and subjective utility of bets. The fact that betting increased with subjective probability also suggests
that tasks such as the betting-on-knowledge task, over which participants can exert some degree of control,
may induce probability weighting curves that differ in their curvature from bets involving patently random
events. This effect can be readily modeled using existing models of probability weighting (e.g., Gonzalez &
Wu, 1999). Finally, the fact that both overconﬁdence and risk seeking (at least in Study 2) in this task cor-
related with narcissism suggests that they might be fruitfully related to other variables of interest to decision
researchers that relate to narcissism, such as altruism (Kagan, 2002), commitment in a relational context
(Buss & Shackleford, 1997; Campbell & Foster, 2002), and wealth effects (Kleefeld, 2001).
This research has several implications for the study of narcissism. It documents a tangible individual-level
cost of narcissism. Narcissism has well-documented negative consequences for other individuals (e.g.,
narcissists’ dating partners or co-workers). Narcissists themselves, however, seem to be relatively unfazed
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and less depression (e.g., Watson & Biderman, 1993). The present research demonstrates that, although
narcissists’ inﬂated self-beliefs may have emotional beneﬁts for the narcissist, they also can have a
measurable negative impact on performance (cf. Robins & Beer, 2001). Interestingly, this ﬁnding comes
in a domain of intellectual performance, which narcissists prize above almost all others (Campbell
et al., 2002).
Narcissism appears to be an individual difference variable that predicts a pattern of decision-making out-
comes in the compound betting-on-knowledge task developed by Goodie (2003). The existence of such a
variable suggests that decision-making biases that are found to exist on the average in participant samples
may be best thought of as biases that are expressed more by some individuals than by others. Stanovich and
West (2000) related performance on judgment tasks internally to each other and also to other achievement
measures, marking relatively new progress in the decision literature. This research extends the analysis
of individual differences in judgment and decision making by relating performance to non-achievement
differences.
The role of narcissism in decision making also helps to reveal motivational factors that affect what are
often viewed as cognitive processes. Narcissists’ inﬂated self-conceptions are part of a larger motivational
system, the goal of which is being better than others in agency domains, being powerful, and having their
selﬁsh needs met (e.g., Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). It is perhaps not surprising that this greater self-regulatory
constellation interjects itself into what should be relatively simple judgments. Despite some recent attention
to the role of emotion and motivation in decision making (e.g., Baron, 1992; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov,
1999; Zeelenberg, 1999), progress on this topic has been relatively sparse.
Caveats
We employed a risk-taking measure that was constrained by bets that were exactly matched to conﬁdence.
The world does not always present us with risky decisions for which our own conﬁdence marks the dividing
line between positive and negative average outcomes. By and large, the world is indifferent to our conﬁ-
dence. The present approach is appropriate for making a statement about the existence of an effect, and took
advantage of narrowly tailored tasks that provided a useful boundary condition between winning and losing
bets. But the ﬁndings at this boundary may overstate the importance of conﬁdence calibration for effective
risk taking in natural contexts. Naturalistic studies would be appropriate to gauge more accurately the true
extent of narcissists’ risk taking and its deviation from that of non-narcissists. Indeed, given the lack of a
signiﬁcant risk-taking effect in Study 3, we urge caution in reaching conclusions about narcissism and risk
taking until studies using additional measures of risk taking are conducted.
On the other hand, our betting-on-conﬁdence paradigm may also have the potential to understate narcis-
sists’risk taking. Participants were presented with many trials and thus had much opportunity, within a stable
environment, to change their decision strategies. In a more naturalistic context, decision makers generally do
not have so many massed opportunities to get it right. In a more naturalistic context, narcissists may display
evengreater overconﬁdence, and we hope that future research examines these effects. Finally, there is at least
one class of environment in which the boundary between winning and losing is systematically set at the con-
ﬁdence of the average participant: stock markets, in which prices ﬂuctuate to reﬂect the average sentiment of
investors.
In Study 3 narcissists were not signiﬁcantly more risk taking on bets that were systematically less favor-
able. However, the non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings should not be taken as the ﬁnal word on narcissists’ risk-taking.
Other research (Goodie, 2004) has shown that, in an equivalent task modiﬁed to make the value of bets inde-
pendent of overconﬁdence, problem gamblers, who were more overconﬁdent than others, were also more
risk taking, even though they had not appeared to be when their greater overconﬁdence led to less favorable
bets. The same may be true of narcissists as well as pathological gamblers.
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In three studies, both overconﬁdence and, to a lesser extent, risk acceptance based on conﬁdence were cor-
related with the social personality construct of narcissism. This was concordant with attributes of narcissists
such as heightened self-enhancement concerns. It also replicates the ﬁnding of paradoxical betting (Goodie,
2003), wherein participants are increasingly willing to accept risk with increasing conﬁdence despite the
declining value of bets with increasing conﬁdence, in a setting where bets are constructed to be fair (having
zero average value) if participants are well calibrated but negatively valued if participants are overconﬁdent.
Narcissists were more overconﬁdent than others, leading to less favorable bets, which were accepted at least
as frequently as those faced by others. This may point theway to future research on the relationships between
overconﬁdence and risk taking with other personality constructs, or with other variables that are known to be
associated with narcissism.
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